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ENHANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS: THE
LEGALITY OF THE VETERANS ACCESS, CHOICE,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2014 UNDER THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Ashton Habighurst+
In April 2014, investigators uncovered untold instances of long delays at the
Phoenix Veterans Affairs Medical Center (Phoenix VAMC) for those attempting
to schedule health care appointments and the resulting deaths of forty veterans
waiting for care, which shocked the nation.1 This revelation sparked calls for
reform and prompted investigations from the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
and congressional oversight committees.2

+
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2009, St. Mary’s College of Maryland. The author would like to thank Professor Benjamin Mintz
for his invaluable insight and guidance throughout this process and the editors and staff of the
Catholic University Law Review for their tireless efforts in contributing to this Comment. She
would also like to thank her family and Matt for their everlasting support and encouragement.
1. Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, A Fatal Wait: Veterans Languish and Die on a VA
Hospital’s Secret List, CNN.COM (Apr. 23, 2014, 9:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/
health/veterans-dying-health-care-delays/ (reporting the deaths of at least forty veterans who died
waiting for appointment at the Phoenix VAMC after being placed on a “secret waiting list” that
was purportedly “part of an elaborate scheme designed by Veterans Affairs managers in Phoenix
who were trying to hide that 1,400 to 1,600 sick veterans were forced to wait months to see a
doctor”).
2. See generally SEN. TOM COBURN, FRIENDLY FIRE: DEATH, DELAY & DISMAY AT THE
VA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS (2014), http://stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.290429.
1403627335!/menu/standard/file/Friendly%20Fire%20VA%20report.pdf [hereinafter FRIENDLY
FIRE] (compiling information from recent VA OIG reports addressing the long wait times at VA
medical facilities and backlogged disability cases). Following the scandal at the Phoenix VAMC,
the OIG found that “veterans waited an average of 115 days for primary care appointments,” a
finding inconsistent with reports by Phoenix VAMC that represented that their patients “waited an
average of only [twenty-four] days.” Id. at 13. In March 2014, it was found that “more than
638,000 veterans were awaiting decisions on disability claims filed with the VA.” Id. at 16; see
also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Audit Shows Extensive Medical Delays for Tens of Thousands of
Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, at A12 [hereinafter Audit Shows Extensive Medical Delays]
(reporting on the recent VA audit of over 700 VA medical facilities, which found that “[thirteen]
percent of patient schedulers said that they had been instructed by ‘supervisors or others’ to enter
false information”). Compare Richard A. Oppel, Jr., No Link Found for Deaths and Veterans’
Care Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2014, at A14 [hereinafter No Link Found] (reporting that
following an investigation of several VA medical facilities, an OIG report determines that there is
no conclusive link between the long wait times at the VA and the forty deaths at the Phoenix
VAMC), with Richard A. Oppel, Jr., VA Official Acknowledges Link Between Delays and Patient
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2014, at A17 [hereinafter Link Between Delays and Patient Deaths]
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As noted by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK): “The problem is not money at the
VA. The problem is management, accountability, and culture.”3 In response,
Congress, in the spring of 2014, worked quickly to reform the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA).4 Following a series of expedited hearings,5 Congress
passed legislation overhauling the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and
establishing new termination procedures for the VA’s senior management.6 In
August 2014, President Obama signed the Veterans Access, Choice, and
Accountability Act of 2014 (Act) into law.7
Addressing the perceived lack of accountability among VA senior executives,
Section 707(a)(1) of the Act reforms the process by which the Secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs may terminate employees positioned within the
Senior Executive Service (“SES” or “senior executives”) classification.8 The
new termination procedures, principally, eliminate the notice requirement for
terminated SES employees, they significantly reduce the amount of time a
terminated SES employee has to appeal an adverse employment decision to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and they nearly eliminate the role of
the MSPB’s three-member Board in reviewing a final administrative law judge
(ALJ) determination.9
In practice, once a senior executive is terminated, the Act provides for an
expedited review by the MSPB, whereby a terminated employee is given seven
(reporting that a senior official at the VA actually acknowledged a link between delays in care and
patient deaths at the Phoenix VAMC).
3. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, 160 CONG. REC. S5207 (July
31, 2014) (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2014-0731/html/CREC-2014-07-31-pt1-PgS5206.htm; see also David A. Fahrenthold, How the VA
Developed Its Culture of Coverups, WASH. POST (May 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/sf/national/2014/05/30/how-the-va-developed-its-culture-of-coverups/ (exposing the manner
in which VA employees “fool[ed] the VA’s own accountability system” by “zero[ing] out the date”
for patient appointments).
4. See, e.g., Department of Veterans Affairs Management Accountability Act, H.R. 4031,
113th Cong. (as passed by the House, May 21, 2014) (making it easier for the Secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs to remove underperforming VA executives).
5. See, e.g., All Actions: H.R. 4031 – 113th Congress (2013–2014), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4031/all-actions (last visited July 21,
2015) (tracking the bill’s progress from its introduction in the House to its movement to the Senate
over a few months).
6. See generally, H.R. 4031 113th Cong. (2014) (changing the procedures by which senior
executives can appeal an adverse personnel action).
7. See Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128
Stat. 1754, 1754 (2014).
8. See id. § 707(d)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799 (stating that “the procedures under section 7543(b)
of title 5 shall not apply to a removal or transfer under this section”) (emphasis added). The U.S.
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) requires certain pre-termination procedures to include “at
least 30 days’ advance written notice,” “a reasonable time . . . to answer orally and in writing,”
representation by an attorney, and a written decision with “specific reasons.” 5 U.S.C. §
7543(b)(1)–(4) (2012).
9. See Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act, § 707(d)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
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days from the date of removal to petition the MSPB for review.10 In turn, an
ALJ from the MSPB has only twenty-one days to review and rule on the
terminated employee’s case. 11 If the ALJ does not make a decision within
twenty-one days, the agency termination becomes final.12 The Act, as a result,
greatly restricts the ability of a VA senior executive to appeal a termination to
the MSPB’s three-member Board,13 while terminated employees positioned at
other federal agencies have no such constraint on their civil service appellate
rights. 14 These changes to the civil service appellate rights of VA senior
executives, thereby, implicate procedural due process concerns.15
This Comment analyzes Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and
Accountability Act of 2014 and addresses whether the new provisions that
truncate terminated VA senior executives’ appellate rights implicate due process
concerns. Part I introduces the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) and
includes a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of creating the SES,
as well as the corresponding rights provided to this class of federal employees.
Part II examines the text and legislative history of Section 707, investigates the
purpose behind the new statutory changes, and compares the appellate rights
provided to all SES employees with those allocated specifically to VA senior
executives. To determine whether the Act provides terminated SES employees
with adequate process, this Comment analyzes case law addressing the
procedural due process framework and the manner in which courts balance
public and private interests. In light of this discussion—scrutinizing the text of
Section 707 and balancing the respective interests involved—Part III concludes
that the Act violates VA SES employees’ procedural due process rights and
advocates for a more internal reform approach, focusing on revising agency
performance appraisal procedures and communicating clear expectations for
employees.

10. Id. § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 46.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (2012).
15. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
This Comment focuses solely on the procedural due process implications imposed by the expedited
appellate procedures. Although the new provisions only affect a specific class of federal
employees—those in the SES at one federal agency, the VA—for this very reason the Act also
potentially violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which states, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
concept of equal protection is implicit in the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal
government. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954).
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I. HISTORICAL REFORM: THE CHANGING RIGHTS OF THE FEDERAL SENIOR
EXECUTIVE SERVICE AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”16 As
noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, due process may be procedural or
substantive. 17 “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property.’”18 Courts utilize
a three-prong inquiry to determine whether the Due Process Clause applies to a
question of law: 1) whether the interest at stake is implicated under the Due
Process Clause; 2) whether a government action deprived an individual of said
interest; and 3) whether the process was adequate in light of the attendant facts
and circumstances of the case.19 For purposes of this three-pronged analysis,
property interests constitute a broad construct, encompassing interests ranging
from employment 20 to government benefits 21 to driver’s licenses. 22
Constitutionally protected employment termination procedures generally
recognized under the Due Process Clause include the right to notice, the right to
a pre-deprivation hearing, and the right to an appeal.23
A. The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978
1. The Need for Reform: Legislative History of the CSRA
In response to criticism of the federal Civil Service Commission, established
by the Pendleton Act (1883),24 and the general public’s distrust of the federal
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762–64 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(discussing the Court’s adoption of procedural and substantive due process).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.
19. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. The Court found that the issue of whether
administrative procedures are “constitutionally sufficient” is properly resolved by balancing “the
governmental and private interests that are affected.” Id. at 334.
20. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985) (analyzing
an employment claim as a potential deprivation of property under the Due Process Clause); Bd. of
Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972) (describing cases in which termination
of public employment was reviewed under the procedural due process analysis).
21. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970) (stating that welfare benefits
are a valid property interest under the Due Process Clause because they are “a matter of statutory
entitlement” where “termination involves state action that adjudicates important rights”).
22. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that the continued possession
of a driver’s license is a valid property interest for procedural due process purposes).
23. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1280–81, 1294–95
(1975).
24. See PATRICIA WALLACE INGRAHAM, THE FOUNDATION OF MERIT: PUBLIC SERVICE IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74–75 (1995) (stating that by the 1970s, many felt that the civil service
was “rigid and rooted in the past,” “large and unwieldy,” and “arcane”). The Pendleton Act was
Congress’s response to the “Spoils Era,” whereby “patronage became central to public
employment.” Id. at 20. It was the first major attempt at reforming the civil service system by
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government following the Watergate scandal, 25 President Jimmy Carter
prioritized the reform of the Civil Service Commission, “seiz[ing] on the issue .
. . in the earliest stages of his campaign for president.” 26 To alleviate the
growing bureaucratic “red tape,” President Carter charged nine separate task
forces with studying the civil service and proposed guidelines to reorganize it.27
Based on the task forces’ findings, the Carter administration abolished the Civil
Service Commission and created what was known as Reorganization Plan
Number 2.28 This plan called for the creation of three new federal entities: the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the MSPB, and the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA).29

introducing merit principles to the federal government, where admission was gained only “through
fair, open, and competitive examinations.” Id. at 26. The Pendleton Act created the Civil Service
Commission to monitor federal civil service and insulate federal employees from politics. Id. at
27–28.
25. See id. at 74–75. A 1978 Roper Organization poll found that “only [ten] percent of the
citizens responding believed that government was free of corruption,” “[l]ess than a fourth believed
that government was an exciting place to work,” and “only [eighteen] percent believed that
government attracted the best people.” Id. at 74.
26. See id. at 75 (stating that Carter “seized on the issue of civil service reform in the earliest
stages of his campaign for president” based on “lessons he had learned [as governor of] Georgia,”
and that Carter campaigned “in large part of the premise of ‘fixing what’s wrong with
government’”).
27. See Dwight Ink, What Was Behind the 1978 Civil Service Reform? in THE FUTURE OF
MERIT: TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT 39, 41–42 (James P. Pfiffner &
Douglas A. Brook eds., 2000).
28. INGRAHAM, supra note 24, at 77; see also S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 3 (1978) (noting the
overwhelming need for reform as the civil service evolved into a complex system involving
numerous procedures and an immense amount of bureaucratic paperwork). The primary objective
of the reform was to streamline the civil service system and reestablish an efficient system of merit.
Id. (addressing task force findings, including the effect of the existing civil service system on the
public, and noting that “valuable resources [were] lost to the public service by a system” that was
“increasingly too cumbersome to compete for talent”).
29. INGRAHAM, supra note 24, at 77; see generally Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). Title II of the CSRA created the structure and functions of
the OPM, which would be led by the Director of OPM. Id. § 201(a), 92 Stat. at 1119 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101–05 (2012)). The Director of OPM would be responsible for
“executing, administering, and enforcing the civil service rules and regulations of the President and
the Office and the laws governing the civil service.” Id. Additionally, Title II created the structure
and functions of the MSPB as a quasi-judicial agency that adjudicates matters within its
jurisdiction, including adverse personnel actions against federal employees. Id. § 202, 92 Stat. at
1122 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1205 (2012)). Finally, Title VII created the structure and functions of
the FLRA, which vested the agency with the responsibility of “establishing policies and guidance”
for labor-management relations in the federal service. Id. § 701, 92 Stat. at 1192, 1196–97 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104–05 (2012)).
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2. Creating the Senior Executive Service and a System of Merit Principles
The creation of the SES, intended by Congress to be the hallmark of a meritbased civil service, 30 was perhaps one of the most influential aspects of the
CSRA.31 The CSRA originally defines an SES member as an employee in “any
position in an agency which is classified above GS-16, 17, or 18 of the General
Schedule.”32 Because SES members are “rank in person” employees with skill
sets that are transferable to other agencies,33 Congress contemplated that their
achievements would create a cascade effect that would trickle down merit-based
principles to all other members of the civil service.34
3. Removal Under the CSRA: Statutory Protections Afforded to SES
Employees
Due to the magnitude of SES employees’ authority, the CSRA also affords
proportionate protections for adverse personnel action taken against them.35 The
cornerstone of these protections is the “for cause” constraint on removal,
whereby an SES employee can only be removed for “less than fully successful
executive performance.”36 What precisely constitutes such a “fully successful”
30. INGRAHAM, supra note 24, at 77–79 (noting its compensation statement “had a significant
performance-based component”). Under the system, derived from the British civil service model,
“the personal qualifications and experience of a member, rather than the job description” determine
the employee’s compensation level. Id. at 79.
31. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 § 402(a), 92 Stat. at 1154–55 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 3131 (2012)). The SES was created “to ‘ensure that the executive management of the
Government of the United States is responsive to the needs, policies, and goals of the Nation.’” Id.
32. Id. § 402(a), 92 Stat. at 1156 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2) (2012)).
Currently, the definition of “Senior Executive Service position” is “any position in an agency which
is classified above GS-15 pursuant to section 5108 or in level IV or V of the Executive Schedule.”
5 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2) (2012).
33. Id. at 78–79.
34. See Patricia W. Ingraham & Donald P. Moynihan, Evolving Dimensions of Performance
from the CSRA Onward, in THE FUTURE OF MERIT, 103, 107 (James P. Pfiffner & Douglas A.
Brook, eds. 2000) (“[T]he [CSRA was] intended to ensure that individual performance was being
monitored at the negative and positive ends of the performance spectrum . . . .”); see also U.S.
OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., GUIDE TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE 2 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDE
TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE], https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/seniorexecutive-service/reference-materials/guidesesservices.pdf. Congress created the SES in hopes of
providing “greater authority to agencies to manage their executive resources.” Id. SES employees’
statutory duties include “direct[ing] the work of an organization unit,” “monitor[ing] progress
toward organizational goals,” “supervis[ing] the work of employees,” and “exercise[ing] important
policy-making, policy-determining, or other executive functions.” 5 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2)(A)–(E)
(2012).
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 3592 (b)(1) (2012) (restricting the involuntary removal of SES employees).
36. See id. § 3592(a)(2) (providing removal procedures for SES employees). An SES member
may be either reassigned or removed for adequate cause. See GUIDE TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE
SERVICE, supra note 34, at 19 (“Agency managers can take a performance-based action after the
career appointee has: received a performance plan; been given a progress review; served the
minimum appraisal period; and been rated on his/her performance. If the rating is unsatisfactory,
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performance is determined agency-by-agency via a statutorily-mandated
“performance appraisal system[].” 37 To remove a senior executive for poor
performance, the CSRA requires that a senior executive “receive [two]
unsatisfactory ratings in any period of [five] consecutive years” or collect a “less
than fully successful” performance rating “twice in any period of [three]
consecutive years.”38
The CSRA further mandates that OPM establish procedural regulations
outlining the pre-termination process.39 These basic pre-termination procedural
guarantees include that “[thirty] days’ advance written notice” must be provided
in the absence of “reasonable cause to believe the employee has committed a
crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed,” to allow the
affected employee the opportunity to seek representation, and to respond to the
removal notice—a window of review of “not less than [seven] days.”40
In the event an agency can justify the for cause removal constraint and then
appropriately follow the pre-termination procedural guidelines mandated by
law, the now terminated senior executive is further entitled to additional
appellate privileges, including the right to a post-termination hearing before a
MSPB ALJ, 41 afforded by the MSPB. 42 Following a hearing, the ALJ—
generally within 120 days43—provides a written decision.44 In the event the
agency’s decision is affirmed, the terminated employee may then appeal to the
the agency [may] . . . remove . . . or reassign [the employee] . . . .”). When an SES employee is
removed, the agency gives him or her written notice of the removal at least thirty days prior to its
effectiveness. Id. at 19–20. If removal is based on unsatisfactory performance, then the SES
member cannot appeal the removal directly to the agency head, but may request an informal MSPB
hearing. Id.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (providing that agencies must create systems for evaluating SES
employee performance). Performance appraisal systems may consider factors such as
“improvements in efficiency, productivity, and quality of work,” “cost efficiency,” and “timeliness
of performance” in evaluating SES employees. 5 U.S.C. § 4313(1)–(3).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 4314(b)(3)–(4).
39. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(c), 7514. OPM regulations provide further details concerning the
process outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b), but note the basic requirements of “[thirty] days’ advance
written notice” of an adverse employment action, the employee’s opportunity to respond during a
“reasonable amount of official time . . . but not less than [seven] days,” and the right to
representation by an attorney must remain intact. 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(b), (c), (e). However, OPM
notes that a senior executive’s right to orally respond “does not include the right to a formal hearing
. . . unless the agency provides for such hearing in its regulations.” Id. § 752.404(c)(2).
40. 5 C.F.R. § 7513(b)(1)–(3); see also 5 C.F.R. § 4303(b)(1)(A)–(C) (outlining the same
process for removal based on unacceptable performance).
41. 5 C.F.R. § 7701(a), (b)(1).
42. Id. § 7513(d).
43. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., JUDGES’ HANDBOOK 1, 52 (2007), www.mspb.gov/
netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=241913&version=242182. The MSPB Judge’s Handbook
states that ALJs should reach decisions within 120 days “except for good cause shown.” Id. The
Handbook states that “due process and fairness,” as well as “caseloads” can be relevant factors for
extending the amount of time it takes an ALJ to issue a decision. Id. at 1.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1).
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MSPB’s three-member Board. 45 As the investigation continues through the
appellate process, the terminated employee is entitled to continued
compensation from the agency.46
B. The Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014
1. A Sense of Urgency: The Legislative History of the Act
Representative Jeff Miller (R-FL), spearheading the campaign for reform in
the wake of the reported abuse and misconduct at the Phoenix VAMC,
introduced the Department of Veterans Affairs Management Accountability Act
of 2014, which became House Bill 4031. 47 This bill primarily amended the
protectionist removal process previously afforded to VA senior executives.48 In
June 2014, Senator Bernard Sanders (I-VT)—hoping to expedite the MSPB
appellate process for adverse employment decisions taken against VA senior
executives—introduced the Veterans’ Access to Care through Choice,
Accountability, and Transparency Act of 2014,49 which later became Senate Bill
2450. 50 Although the Senate did not pass Senate Bill 2450, a companion
measure, House Bill 3230, passed and evolved into the Veterans Access, Choice,
and Accountability Act of 2014.51
45. Id. § 7701(e)(1)(A). If the MSPB affirms the agency’s decision and upholds the
termination, then the affected employee may “petition[] the Board for review within [thirty] days
after the receipt of the decision.” Id.
46. Id. § 7701(b)(2)(B) (providing that the affected party “shall receive pay, compensation,
and all other benefits as terms and conditions of employment during the period pending the outcome
of any petition for review”).
47. H.R. 4031 (113th): Department of Veterans Affairs Management Accountability Act of
2014, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4031# (last visited Aug. 25,
2015); see supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
48. Department of Veterans Affairs Management Accountability Act of 2014, H.R. 4031,
113th Cong. § 2(a) (as passed by the House, May 21, 2014). This bill enhances the Secretary of
the VA’s ability to terminate SES employees by adding substandard performance as a new “for
cause” factor. Id.
49. See, e.g., Veteran’s Access to Care Through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency
Act of 2014, S. 2450, 113th Cong. § 713(d)(1). This section outlines the MSPB’s expedited review
process for an appeal by a terminated SES employee. Id. The MSPB “shall issue a decision not
later than [twenty-one] days after the date of the appeal.” Id. If the MSPB cannot make a decision
within the twenty-one day timeframe, “the [MSPB] shall submit to Congress a report that explains
the reason why [it] is unable to issue a decision in accordance with such requirement in such case.”
Id. § 713(d)(2). The appellant “may not receive any pay, awards, bonuses, incentives, allowances[,]
. . . or benefits from the Secretary until the [MSPB] has made a final decision.” Id. § 713(d)(5).
Finally, the MSPB’s decision “shall not be subject to any further appeal.” Id. § 713(d)(6).
50. See Veterans’ Access to Care Through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency Act of
2014, S. 2450, 113th Cong. This bill never passed the Senate, but it was later incorporated into the
Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014. See infra note 52 and accompanying
text.
51. See H.R. 3230, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted). Introduced by Congressman Harold Rogers
(R-KY) on October 2, 2013, this bill passed the House the day after it was introduced, but stalled
in the Senate for several months. See H.R. 3230 – Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act
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The discussion and debates concerning the accountability provisions under
Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014
were very limited. In fact, the bill proceeded through the legislative process in
just four months and most of the accountability provisions were simply lifted
from House Bill 4031.52 Still, some had their doubts. Expressing dissatisfaction
with these provisions, Representative Mike Michaud (D-ME), the ranking
Democratic Member on the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, exclaimed
that “the [Committee] was not given the opportunity to consider th[e] bill.”53

of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3230 (last
visited Aug. 5, 2015). The Senate eventually acted after the Phoenix VAMC scandal, and passed
House Bill 3230 in lieu of Senate Bill 2450. See Bronstein & Griffin, supra note 1 (indicating that
news of the Phoenix VAMC scandal broke during the spring of 2014); H.R. 3230 – Veterans Access,
Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, supra (stating that House Bill 3230 passed the Senate on
June 11, 2014); see also Daniel Wilson, Senate Overwhelmingly Passes VA Healthcare Reform
Bill, LAW360 (June, 2014, 6:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547170/senate-over
whelmingly-passes-va-health-care-reform-bill (stating that Senate Bill 2450, which would have
allowed veterans to seek care outside the VA system under certain conditions and funded the
construction of new hospitals, was attached to House Bill 3230 to allow for faster consideration).
The enacted bill retained many of the same expedited MSPB review provisions suggested in the
stalled House bill, including one stating that an MSPB ALJ “shall issue a decision not later than
[twenty-one] days after the date of the appeal,” and once a decision is issued, it “shall be final and
shall not be subject to any further appeal.” H.R. 3230, § 707(a)(1).
52. Compare H.R. 4031, § 2(a) (unenacted bill), with H.R. 3230, § 707(a)(1) (enacted bill)
(indicating that House Bill 3230 adopted many of the same accountability provisions House Bill
4031); see also 160 CONG. REC. H4694 (daily ed. May 21, 2014) (statement of Rep. Miller)
(acknowledging that the Secretary of the VA “want[ed] to hold others accountable, but he [was]
being held back by a failed civil service that [made] it nearly impossible to remove SES employees”
because the system was “so calcified in bureaucratic red tape that it [was] easier for someone to get
a bonus than it [was] to be given some type of discipline”); but see Letter from Carol A. Bonosaro,
President, Senior Execs. Ass’n, to House of Representatives (May 20, 2014), https://senior
execs.org/images/documents/policy_letters/SEA_Letter_to_House_Opposing_HR_4031_000211
70-2x87C30.pdf (highlighting, in opposition to House Bill 4031, the SEA’s contention that SES
members are already subject to removal for poor performance and that “3,000 employees at the VA
had been removed, including fourteen Senior Executives over the past two years”). The letter goes
on to state that the proposed legislation would do nothing to change the culture at the VA and would
likely only cause more harm, as it could “create a culture where quality managers and executives
choose to work elsewhere.” Id.; see also Press Release, Senior Execs. Ass’n, SEA Opposes Senate
Action, Urges Conference Committee to Address Problems at VA instead of Scapegoating Career
Senior Executives (June 11, 2014), https://seniorexecs.org/newsroom/press-releases/416-seaopposes-senate-action-urges-conference-committee-to-address-problems-at-va-instead-of-scape
goating-career-senior-executives-2 (recounting the quick legislative process for House Bill 3230
and remarking that there was “no debate, amendments or committee hearings”).
53. 160 CONG. REC. H4695 (daily ed. May 21, 2014) (statement of Rep. Michaud).
Representative Michaud further explained the importance of the markup process:
I believe this bill would be stronger and more reflective of the substantive reforms
necessary in the Department if it had been allowed to go through the committee markup
process. . . . This bill will simply turn approximately 400 senior executive civil service
positions across the VA into essentially at-will positions, of which 165 are in the Veterans
Health Administration. More importantly, [House Bill] 4031 does not adequately
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Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD) noted the lack of “markup in committee,”
the fact that the bill “was brought to the floor with little notice,” and the potential
due process concerns arising from what the Congressman perceived as a “kneejerk reaction to a bad situation, painted with a very broad brush.”54 By the time
House Bill 3230 reached the Senate, the political pressure to pass some sort of
reform as soon as possible inundated Congress.55 Remarks from Senator John
McCain (R-AZ) reflect this political vice-grip, acknowledging that the bill was
“not perfect legislation,” but nevertheless urged that “for [Congress] not to pass
it at this time would send a message to the men and women who have served
this country that we have abandoned them.”56
This sense of urgency stymied debate, evidenced by the lack of additional
consideration and the addition of a new finality clause—an amendment not
introduced until after Congress issued the Joint House and Senate Conference
Committee Report.57 The new finality clause, which removes the ability of a

address the performance metrics of VA executives. It doesn’t provide any framework
for ensuring problems and failures don’t occur in the first place.
Id.
54. Id. at H4697 (statement of Rep. Hoyer). Representative Hoyer further objected:
I cannot support this bill as written. I believe it opens the door to a slippery slope of
undoing the careful civil service protections that have been in place for decades. This is
about due process. Now due process is put under stress at critical times. Pursuing due
process at times when there is no stress is not difficult. The test of a society is whether,
at times of stress, it can follow due process and the law. This bill does not provide for
that.
Id. Representative Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) similarly noted his reservations about the new
accountability provisions, stating that they “give[] the VA Secretary broad authority to fire [SES]
employees even though the VA already has the tools to remove SES employees who are rated
unsatisfactory.” Id. at E1316 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2014) (statement of Rep. Van Hollen). These same
concerns are echoed in recent debates surrounding H.R. 1994, a recent bill introduced by
Congressman Jeff Miller (R-FL). See H.R. 1994, 114th Cong. (2015) (unenacted). This bill, if
enacted, provides non-executive employees terminated for poor performance a similar truncated
appellate process and revises the termination procedures under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) by requiring an
appeal made to the MSPB be filed within seven days of termination, while only allowing an ALJ
forty-five days to make a decision. See H.R. 1994 § 715(d)(1), § 715(e)(1)–(2) (2015). H.R. 1994
passed the House on July 29, 2015, despite dissenting views of a similar nature, charging that
“Section 2 would provide only an abbreviated level of post-determination due process,” and that
this lack of due process “may provide the grounds by which courts overturn disciplinary actions
taken by the VA under color of this authority.” See H.R. 1994 – Veterans Accountability Act of
2015, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1994 (last visited
Aug. 12, 2015).
55. See, e.g., id. at S5206 (daily ed. July 31, 2014) (statement of Sen. McCain) (“If there was
ever a definition of an emergency, that emergency faces us today . . . .”).
56. Id. at S5207 (statement of Sen. McCain).
57. House Report 564 was ordered to be printed on July 28, 2014 and stated that the “Senate
recede[s] from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an
amendment” as provided in House Report 564. Id. at 1. House Bill 3230 was subsequently enacted
as the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 on August 7, 2014. Veterans
Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1754.
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terminated VA senior executive to appeal to the MSPB’s three-member Board,
places even more pressure on the twenty-one day window provided to the ALJ
to reconsider an agency’s decision. In effect, this last minute amendment
removed an otherwise guaranteed procedural right enjoyed by other senior
executive employees.58 President Obama, nevertheless, signed the bill into law
within eleven days of the Joint Conference Committee Report.59
2. Revising the CSRA: Section 707 of the Act
In compliance with the CSRA, members of the SES were typically provided
with thirty days advance written notice of termination, the opportunity to
respond to the advanced notice, and could appeal their termination to the
MSPB. 60 Section 707 of the Act revises these pre- and post-termination
procedures of VA SES employees. 61 For example, under Section 707 a VA
senior executive is neither afforded the pre-termination procedure of notice, nor
is given the same opportunity to respond.62 Additionally, while a terminated VA
senior executive may still appeal an agency decision to the MSPB, this appellate
review process is hastened as the ALJ only has twenty-one days to issue a
decision.63 If an ALJ is unable to meet this hurried deadline, “the removal or
transfer is final” and the decision “shall not be subject to any further appeal.”64

58. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-564, at 47 (2014) (Conf. Rep.). Neither the initial House bill nor
the Senate bill contained the finality provision for the new 5 U.S.C. § 713(e)(3), which states that
“[i]n any case in which the administrative judge cannot issue a decision in accordance with the
[twenty-one] day requirement under paragraph (1) the removal or transfer is final.” Id. (emphasis
added); see also S. 2450, 113th Cong., § 409 (2014); H.R. 4031, 113th Cong., § 2(a) (as passed by
H.R., May 21, 2014) (not indicating that the removal or transfer would be final).
59. See Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1754 (noting that the bill was signed into law on
August 7, 2014); see also H.R. REP. NO. 113-564, at 1 (2014) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the
Conference Report was issued on July 28, 2014).
60. See Senior Executive Service Performance Suspension and Removal, U.S. OFFICE OF
PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/performance/
#url=Suspension-and-Removal (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
61. See generally Pub. L. No. 113-146, § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1754, 1799 (2014) (altering
removal procedures for Senior Executive Service members).
62. See id. § 707(d)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799 (stating that “the procedures under section 7543(b)
of title 5 shall not apply to a removal or transfer under this section”) (emphasis added). Despite
this new provision, VA officials have, based on advice from VA attorneys, instituted a policy
providing candidates for removal with a five-day notice period. Jacqueline Klimas, VA’s 5-day
Firing Notice Too Long for Congress, Too Short for Lawyers, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2014), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/30/va-5-day-firing-notice-too-long-for-congress-toos/?page=all.
63. § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
64. Pub. L. No. 113-146, 128 Stat. 1754 at § 713(e)(1). During the limited debates concerning
these provisions, the House proposed an amendment providing the Secretary with the authority to
remove a VA SES employee based on poor performance. H.R. REP. NO. 113-564, at 80 (2014)
(Conf. Rep.). The Senate submitted Amendment 3237 to House Bill 3230, which initially proposed
the provisions regarding expedited review by the MSPB and included the twenty-one day
adjudication period by an ALJ. 160 CONG. REC. S3610 (daily ed. June 11, 2014) (amendment
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Moreover, unlike non-VA SES employees, the terminated VA senior executive
is not entitled to receive “any pay, awards, bonuses, incentives, allowances[,] . .
. or benefits” during the appeals process.65
To comply with the expedited review outlined in Section 707, the MSPB
issued an “interim final rule” concerning the process, effective October 22,
2014.66 Despite comments questioning the validity of the expedited review and
its effect on the actual hearing provided,67 this new rule imposed new discovery
restrictions on the termination process68 and created a rebuttable presumption
that the agency’s determination was justified.69 This presumption contradicts
the MSPB’s practices regarding other federal agencies, which must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the penalty promotes the efficiency of the
service and is reasonable.”70

proposed by Sen. Tester). Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) addressed the reasoning behind the expedited
review, stating that “[b]y getting rid of incentives to falsify wait times and make it easier to remove
bad managers, we will hold more folks accountable.” Id. at S3594 (statement of Sen. Tester). It
was not until the conference between the Senate and the House that the provisions concerning the
finality of an ALJ’s determination were added, as the Conference Agreement “generally adopts the
Senate provision with an amendment to change the level of review at the MSPB.” H.R. REP. NO.
113-564, at 80. This change provides no further appeal beyond the ALJ, such as a second level
review by the MSPB’s three-member Board. Id.
65. See supra text accompanying note 46; § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
66. See Merit Systems Protection Board, 79 Fed. Reg. 63,031 (Oct. 22, 2014) (to be codified
at 5 C.F.R. pts. 1201, 1210) (stating that the Board is “adopting as final an interim rule that adapted
the Board’s regulations to . . . new laws applicable to the removal or transfer of [SES] employees
of the [VA]”).
67. See id. at 63,031–32 (listing the various concerns with the interim rule raised by a number
of commenters). For instance, one commenter expressed that terminated employees might not have
“sufficient and equal time to present their cases.” Id. at 63,032.
68. See id. at 63,031. The new discovery rules “limit the parties to [ten] interrogatories, no
depositions, and no second round of discovery” to enable the feasibility of the shortened review
process. Id.
69. See id. at 63,031–32 (disagreeing with the objection that giving the Secretary of the VA
a rebuttable presumption for the appropriateness of a penalty determination is inconsistent with
statutory and case law). The MSPB explains that it interpreted the language of 38 U.S.C. §
713(a)(1), which provides the Secretary with the authority to remove a senior executive “if the
Secretary determines the performance or misconduct of the individual warrants such removal,” as
granting the Secretary “broad discretion” to determine the appropriate penalty to impose upon an
SES employee. Id. at 63,031.
70. Id. (recognizing the difference in “the penalty analysis the Board employs in other appeals
[for other agencies]”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(1)(ii)(2014) (stating that the agency action
will be sustained if “[i]t is brought under any other provision of law or regulation and is supported
by a preponderance of the evidence”). The appellant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence arguments regarding “[i]ssues of jurisdiction,” “[t]imeline of the appeal,” and
“[a]ffirmative defenses.” Id. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i)–(iii).
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C. Procedural Due Process: An Analytical Framework
1. Property Interests Subject to Protection
It is an established principal that “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by
the Constitution,” but are instead “created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source.” 71
Consequently, an individual asserting deprivation of procedural due process
must assert a “legitimate claim of entitlement” and not a mere “abstract need or
desire for it.”72
Based on this framework, the Supreme Court held in Board of Regents v.
Roth 73 that a professor did not have a valid property interest in tenured
reemployment where he had only contracted for a fixed one-year term of
employment.74 The Supreme Court expounded, stating that the nature of the
valid property interest—for procedural due process—is more akin to the facts in
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 75 where an employee was the
subject of a “for cause” termination after his employer discovered that he had
been dishonest on his job application.76 The Loudermill Court held that because
“[d]ismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes,” the employee had a
constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, and that
the employee’s interest in “reaching an accurate decision” in his case is “of
obvious value.”77
2. Determining What Process is Due: The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing
Test
After discovering the encroachment of a valid property interest, courts must
then determine how much process an individual is afforded.78 While courts

71. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Covell v. Menkis, 595
F.3d 673, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2010) (clarifying that a valid property interest for purposes of the Due
Process Clause “can arise from a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or implied
contract”).
72. Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577.
73. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
74. Id. at 578; but see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602–03 (1972) (holding that a
professor of ten years provided enough evidence to put at issue whether he had a legitimate property
interest in his claim of tenure created through the university’s implied tenure policy).
75. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
76. Id. at 535, 438–40.
77. Id. at 543; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) (finding a valid property
interest in employment subject to “for cause” termination where “Congress was obviously intent
on according a measure of statutory job security to governmental employees”).
78. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (stating that the Supreme Court has
“consistently . . . held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived
of a property interest” and that “[the] Court has increasingly . . . had . . . to consider the extent to
which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some type of property
interest even if such a hearing is provided thereafter”).
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generally recognize that legislation affords adequate due process,79 courts must
still make this determination on the basis of the attendant facts and
circumstances of each particular case.80 The hallmark case for determining what
process is due is Mathews v. Eldridge,81 where the Supreme Court explained,
“due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.”82
In Mathews, the Court sought to determine whether a recipient of Social
Security Administration (SSA) disability benefits received adequate process
prior to the termination of his benefits. 83 In evaluating the adequacy of the
procedures provided, the Court fashioned a three-part balancing framework,
analyzing the various interests involved: 1) the private interest affected;84 2) the
fairness and reliability of the current process, including whether or not additional
procedural safeguards are warranted;85 and 3) the government’s interest in being
free of any potential administrative burden.86
79. See, e.g., Gattis v. Gravett, 806 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that an action of
the Arkansas legislature removing certain personnel in the sheriff’s department from civil service
status is constitutional because “the legislature which creates a property interest may rescind it,
whether the legislative body is federal or state”). The Eighth Circuit held in Gattis that where the
Arkansas legislature had removed the appellants’ civil service employment protections before
terminating their employment, the employees’ property interest had already been eliminated. Id.;
see also Gallo v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 349 F.3d 1169, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that “[w]hen the [governmental] action is purely legislative, the statute satisfies due process if the
enacting body provides public notice and open hearings”).
80. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
81. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
82. Id. at 334 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
83. Id. at 323–25, 349. Petitioner Eldridge, after the SSA determined that he was no longer
totally disabled and therefore no longer unemployable, alleged that he should have been afforded a
pre-termination hearing prior to the SSA’s termination of his disability benefits. Id. at 324–25.
84. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 340. The Court determined that the private interest implicated
was the “uninterrupted receipt of [a] source of income” but found that while this “may be
significant,” it was not necessarily vital to Eldridge’s basic needs for survival because “[e]ligibility
for disability benefits . . . is not based upon financial need.” Id. at 340–42; but see Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (finding that the termination of welfare benefits—without a pretermination hearing—during the pendency of the determination of continuing eligibility is too
detrimental because the “crucial factor” is that termination of these benefits “may deprive an
eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits”).
85. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. The Court found that the potential value for a pre-termination
hearing is minimal because SSA’s adjudication rests on medical documentation, which is a “more
sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare
entitlement.” Id. The Court proceeded to state that information in a welfare proceeding turns on
witness statements, and thus the final determination depends upon “witness credibility and
veracity,” which would prompt the need for a hearing. Id. at 343–44; see also Goldberg, 397 U.S.
at 270 (holding that welfare recipients must be “given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses relied on by the [government]” due to the nature of information involved in a welfare
termination proceeding).
86. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347. The Court recognized “the administrative burden and other
societal costs” imposed with the requirement of a pre-termination hearing, and finds that the costs
are not as insubstantial as the cost associated with the additional protection to those “whom the
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a. Factor One: Assessing the Private Interest
When evaluating the private interest affected, courts generally recognize that
the termination of employment is rather significant because it “depriv[es] a
person of the means of livelihood.” 87 The Loudermill Court belabored this
interest, explaining, “[w]hile a fired worker may find employment elsewhere,
doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable
circumstances under which he left his previous job.”88
b. Factor Two: Balancing the Risk of Error Associated with the
Procedures Employed and the Interplay between Pre- and PostTermination Hearings
Procedures typically recognized as satisfying due process requirements
include notice and an opportunity for a hearing, “which must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”89 However, the extent and nature
of the hearing afforded is neither a settled concept nor an actual requirement in
every case.90
For example, the terminated employee in Loudermill argued that he was
entitled to a pre-termination opportunity to respond to the allegations that
ultimately resulted in his dismissal.91 The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with
Mr. Loudermill, emphasizing that “the root requirement” of procedural due
process is “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest.”92 Importantly, however, the Court
noted carefully that the degree of pre-termination procedures “need not be
elaborate,” as such requirements depend in large part on “the nature of the

preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving” could redirect
resources provided for other social programs. Id. at 348.
87. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985).
88. Id.
89. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 552 (1965); see also Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (stating that a fundamental requirement of due process is “the opportunity to
be heard”).
90. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (stating that “[t]he judicial model of an evidentiary hearing
is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking [sic] in all
circumstances”). Rather, at a minimum, the affected party must be afforded an opportunity to
present evidence to an impartial judge. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; see also Washington v. Kirksey,
811 F.2d 561, 564 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that “[d]ue process of law . . . [is not satisfied] where
the state has gone through the mechanics of providing a hearing, but the hearing is totally devoid
of a meaningful opportunity to be heard”).
91. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535–36. Loudermill argued that the procedures under which he
was terminated were facially unconstitutional because he was neither able to respond to charges
prior to his removal nor was he able to receive a “sufficiently prompt postremoval hearing[].” Id.
at 536.
92. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (emphasis in original) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
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subsequent proceedings.” 93 Since Mr. Loudermill was afforded a full posttermination hearing before the Civil Service Commission, 94 the Court
determined that the pre-termination procedures of notice, coupled with an
opportunity to respond, were sufficient.95
Courts have also recognized that the absence of a pre-termination hearing does
not necessarily render process inadequate.96 These cases typically involve an
employer suspending or terminating an employee on account of criminal
misconduct and usually involve significant post-termination processes.97
For example, in Gilbert v. Homar,98 a police officer was suspended without
any form of notice or hearing after he was arrested and charged with a drugrelated felony.99 The Supreme Court held that the process afforded to the officer
was adequate because the public interest in immediately suspending an
employee who is in a position of “public trust” is significant.100
The Supreme Court similarly determined in Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation v. Mallen101 that adequate process was afforded to a suspended
banking employee, absent notice or hearing, after the employee was indicted for

93. Id. at 545 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see West v. Grand Cnty.,
967 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that “[t]he standards for a pretermination hearing are
not stringent because of the expectation that a more formal post-termination hearing will remedy
any resulting deficiencies”); see also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168–69 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (rejecting a non-probationary federal employee’s claim that failure to provide a preevidentiary hearing increased the possibility of wrongful termination because the statute provides
for recuperation of retroactive pay if termination is later determined to be wrongful on appeal).
Justice Powell balanced the interests established in Mathews and determined that the government’s
interest of maintaining “employee efficiency and discipline,” noting that retention of an
unsatisfactory employee “can adversely affect discipline and morale in the workplace,” outweighed
the private interest of a “temporary interruption of income.” Id. at 168–69; but see id. at 185 (White,
J., dissenting) (finding that the employee’s ability to appeal a removal action affords rights not
previously available because “a hearing must be held at some time before a competitive civil service
employee may be finally terminated for misconduct” in order to satisfy the general principle of due
process). Id. at 185. Justice White further addressed the specific facts of the agency’s decision to
terminate the employee, questioning the impartiality of the agency officer adjudicating the
employee’s removal because the “hearing examiner’s own reputation, as well as the efficiency of
the service, was at stake.” Id. at 199.
94. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535–36. While the Commission-appointed hearing referee
urged that Loudermill be reinstated, the Commission ultimately upheld his dismissal. Id.
95. See id. at 546–48. The Court stated that while “[t]he opportunity to present reasons . . .
why [a] proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement,” ordering
an additional pre-termination process “would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s
interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id. at 546.
96. See infra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
98. 520 U.S. 924 (1997).
99. Id. at 926–28.
100. Id. at 932.
101. 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
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making false statements to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).102
The Court explained that the statute authorizing the FDIC to suspend the
employee was enacted for the purpose of providing federal banking agencies
more “effective regulatory powers” when responding to felonious acts
committed by federal employees, especially when that act is of a dishonest
nature or one that constitutes a breach of the public trust.103 The Court reasoned
that the risk of error was minimal because the statute still required a formal postsuspension hearing104 and the governmental interest in preserving the “integrity
of the banking industry” is strong.105
Because pre-termination and post-termination procedures are “inextricably
intertwined,” the degree of post-termination process deemed constitutionally
sufficient is wholly dependent upon the nature of the pre-termination process
afforded an employee.106 In Carter v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation
Center,107 the Sixth Circuit noted that a terminated employee was still entitled
to a more thorough post-termination hearing based on the extent of pretermination procedures.108 Although the court remanded the case to determine
the degree of post-termination process, it stated that “at a minimum,” a posttermination hearing requires the “assistance of counsel,” the ability to “call
witnesses and produce evidence,” and the “opportunity to challenge the
evidence.”109
c. Factor Three: Assessing the Governmental Interest
The final factor of the Mathews’ balancing test considers the governmental
interest and the associated administrative or financial burdens imposed by
providing a particular degree of process. 110 One of the more common
102. Id. at 236–38, 248.
103. Id. at 232–33.
104. Id. at 234–35, 245.
105. Id. at 244.
106. Carter v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1985). The
Sixth Circuit remarked that “[w]here . . . a court has approved an abbreviated pre-termination
hearing, due process requires that a discharged employee’s post-termination hearing be
substantially more ‘meaningful.’” Id.
107. 767 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
108. Id. at 273–74 (noting that plaintiff, pre-termination, was provided “notice of the charge
[underlying the termination]” and “opportunity to rebut [the] charge”); see also Powell v.
Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1458 (10th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that “[b]ecause the posttermination hearing is where the definitive fact-finding occurs, there is an obvious need for more
formal due process”); Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1008 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing the
dual roles of the pre-termination hearing, which is “designed to invoke the employer’s discretion .
. . [and] his willingness to reconsider [the termination],” and the post-termination hearing, which
“serve[s] to ferret out bias, pretext, deception, and corruption by the employer in discharging the
employee”) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
109. Carter, 767 F.2d at 273–74.
110. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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governmental interests advanced is the government’s desire to expeditiously
remove unsatisfactory employees. 111 For instance, in Biliski v. Red Clay
Consolidated School District Board of Education,112 the Third Circuit held that
the governmental interest in terminating an employee who received five
consecutive unsatisfactory performance evaluations was stronger than the
employee’s interest in continued employment. 113 Because the employee was
unable to identity any additional procedures that would have reduced the risk of
error, the court held that the employer provided adequate notice by way of five
memoranda outlining the employee’s poor performance and warnings of
potential termination.114
In contrast to Biliski, the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania held in Mosley v. City of Pittsburgh Public School District115 that
the terminated Director of Staffing and Recruitment for Pittsburgh’s Public
School District received inadequate process116 when he was removed for poor
performance without an opportunity to refute his supervisor’s performancerelated claims.117 The court disregarded the government’s asserted interest of
“efficiently removing unsatisfactory employees” in light of the employee’s
greater interest in employment, coupled with the significant risk of error when
the employer fails to provide either a pre-termination or a post-termination
hearing.118
II. A BREAKDOWN IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: VA SENIOR EXECUTIVE’S
LIMITED RIGHTS UNDER THE VETERANS ACCESS, CHOICE, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2014
A. An Analysis of Section 707 Under the Procedural Due Process Framework:
Is a Property Interest Implicated?
Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014
includes worrisome provisions regarding the appellate rights of VA senior
executives. Specifically, Section 707 of the Act eliminates the usual pretermination notice and opportunity to respond and expedites the MSPB appellate
process by limiting the time—just twenty-one days—in which an ALJ must

111. See Biliski v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 221 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(evaluating the private interest of a terminated employee’s continued employment, against the
school district’s interest in removing underperforming employees).
112. 574 F.3d 214 (3rd Cir. 2009).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 222–23. The court also held that the employee’s letter to the Board of Education
constituted a fair opportunity to present his case. Id.
115. 702 F. Supp. 2d 561 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
116. Id. at 563, 576.
117. Id. at 568–69.
118. Id. at 576–77.
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make a determination.119 Moreover, if an ALJ does not render a decision within
the twenty-one day deadline, the termination is final and the terminated senior
executive is denied the opportunity to appeal to the MSPB’s three-member
Board. 120 These provisions, directed particularly at VA senior executives,
effectively eradicate constitutionally understood procedural safeguards afforded
to other senior executives under the CSRA.
As established in Loudermill, an individual’s interest in continued
employment is a valid property interest subject to procedural protections per the
Due Process Clause when that employment is subject to “for cause”
termination. 121 Because SES employees are only subject to “for cause”
termination, a VA senior executive, by default, has a constitutionally protected
property interest in his or her employment.122 Therefore, serious questions exist
as to whether the Section 707 provisions afford adequate process.
B. How Much Process is Due? Balancing the Interests Under the Mathews
Test
Courts generally believe that legislation affords adequate process. 123 The
interests involved in the new termination procedures, however, must still be
balanced under the Mathews test to ensure that such procedures actually afford
a terminated VA senior executive adequate process.124
The private interest at stake is unambiguous: senior executives have a
recognized right to continued employment and to a fair hearing by an impartial
judge.125 VA senior executives are high-level employees who are entrusted with
substantial authority, 126 an authority arguably stronger than the authority
119. See Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, §
707(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1754, 1754–1801 (2014).
120. Id. § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
121. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985) (stating that the
employees in the case had a valid property interest in their employment where they could be
dismissed only for “misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office”).
122. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(2) (2012) (stating that an SES
member may be removed “for less than fully successful executive performance”).
123. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1984) (“[A] legislature generally provides
constitutionally adequate process simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the extent
the statute regulates private conduct, affording those within the statute’s reach a reasonable
opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply
with those requirements.”).
124. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth the three-part balancing
test involving the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the governmental interest).
125. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538–39; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 169–70
(1974) (Howell, J., concurring) (finding that a terminated civil service employee’s interest only
resulted in a “temporary injury” because the employee has the right to appeal an adverse decision
and potentially recuperate full retroactive pay if the removal was wrongful).
126. See Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-446, §
707(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1754, 1800 (2014) (defining “senior executives” as “career appointees” as well
as “administrative” or “executive” employees); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2)–(4) (noting that
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provided to the security guard in Loudermill where the private interest was
considered “significant.” 127 Given the permanent nature of termination, the
interest of continued public employment by VA senior executives is significant.
The next factor in determining whether VA SES employees receive adequate
process under the Act is whether Section 707’s elimination of pre-termination
notice and its post-termination expedited review increases the risk of erroneous
employment decisions.128 Courts have generally recognized a right to some type
of a pre- and post-deprivation hearing before an impartial decision-maker,129 as
avoiding an erroneous termination decision is particularly important because of
the permanence of termination.130 Although the expedited review does not
eliminate a senior executive’s right to appeal a termination decision to the
MSPB, 131 the truncated appellate process has the effect of eliminating, by
removing several of the typical pre-termination procedures, 132 the senior
executive’s right to a meaningful post-termination hearing by an impartial
judge.133
The provisions imposing a twenty-one day decision deadline on an ALJ, while
making a termination final if the ALJ does not meet that deadline, effectively
remove the opportunity for a post-termination hearing. 134 Unlike SES
employees in other federal agencies, VA senior executives have no additional
recourse because Section 707 also removes the right to appeal—in these
circumstances—to the MSPB’s three-member Board.135
Unlike the employee in Loudermill, who received a full post-termination
procedure and, per the Court’s holding, should have also received pretermination notice and the opportunity to respond, 136 terminated VA senior
executives will be denied any meaningful opportunity to be heard pre- and posttermination. 137 VA senior executives will, in effect, experience the same

senior executives may wield great responsibility within the agencies they work for, including
directing work, managing projects, and supervising other employees).
127. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 549 (Marshall, J., concurring).
128. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
129. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547–48; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
130. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
131. See Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at
1799 (stating that terminated employees may appeal to the MSPB, but that the MSPB must refer
the appeal to an ALJ).
132. See id. (stating that the MSPB or ALJ “may not stay any removal or transfer” and that
“[d]uring the period beginning on the date on which an individual appeals a removal . . . and ending
on the date that the [ALJ] issues a final decision . . . [the terminated employee] may not receive any
pay, awards, . . . or benefits”).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 535–36, 542–44 (1985).
137. See § 707(a)(1). SES employees’ opportunity for an adequate hearing will be severely
curtailed because their pre-termination and post-termination process will be truncated and they may
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procedural defects as the employee in Carter, a case that explained that an
“abbreviated pre-termination hearing” of notice and response still triggered a
“substantially more meaningful” post-termination hearing.138
The practical implications of Section 707 are already apparent. The MSPB
promulgated a final rule implementing the new appellate process,139 affording
the VA a rebuttable presumption140 unavailable to any other federal agency.141
Accordingly, even if an ALJ is able to meet the twenty one-day deadline and the
terminated employee navigates the reduced time frame for discovery, 142 the
heightened standard necessary to overcome this presumption 143 effectively
makes it incredibly difficult for a terminated VA senior executive to present his
or her case and prevail.144 Therefore, the opportunity to appeal to the MSPB’s
three-member Board—a right conferred to every other SES employee in every
other agency—is even more necessary to “remedy any resulting deficiencies.”145
Further, as terminations based on performance and misconduct often involve
disputes of material fact, 146 the need for appropriate appellate hearing

not even be able to have their cases heard by ALJs depending upon whether the ALJ assigned to
the case makes a decision within the statutorily-imposed deadline. Id.
138. Carter v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1985).
139. See Merit Systems Protection Board, 79 Fed. Reg. 63,031, 63,031–32 (Oct. 22, 2014) (to
be codified at 5 C.F.R. pts. 1201, 1210).
140. Id. (“An appellant may rebut [the presumption in favor of the Secretary’s determination]
by establishing that the selected penalty was unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.”).
141. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, §
707(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1754, at 1798 (2014) (“The procedures under section 7543(b) of title 5 shall
not apply to a removal or transfer under this section.”). The MSPB noted that this presumption
“differs from the penalty analysis . . . employ[ed] in other appeals.” Id.
142. Merit Systems Protection Board, 79 Fed. Reg. at 63,031 (noting that implementing
regulations for the Act retain the previous discovery rules, limiting discovery “to [ten]
interrogatories, no depositions, and no second round of discovery” absent an exception made on
the part of the ALJ). The MSPB, in assessing comments on the Act’s implementing regulations,
asserted that it was “convinced that broader discovery rules [would be] incompatible with the
requirement to adjudicate [SES employee termination cases] within [twenty-one] days.” Id.; see
also 5 C.F.R. § 1210.12 (2015) (outlining discovery rules for VA SES employee termination cases
before an ALJ).
143. Merit Systems Protection Board, 79 Fed. Reg. at 63031. The Board noted that it generally
“requires that an agency prove by preponderant evidence that the penalty promotes the efficiency
of the service and is reasonable.” Id. However, the new rules provide that the VA Secretary may
“remove an individual from a [SES] position . . . if the Secretary determines the performance or
misconduct of the individual warrants such removal.” Id.
144. See id. (discussing how commenters on the new SES employee removal rules have opined
that the new rules will result in deficient process).
145. West v. Grand Cnty., 967 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1992). The Tenth Circuit reasoned
that pre-termination processes do not need to be significant where there is substantial and formal
post-termination process. Id.
146. See, e.g., Mosely v. City of Pittsburgh Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 561, 577 (W.D. Pa.
2010) (“Thus, contrary to the School District’s assertion, issues of material fact, as well as
credibility issues, exist as to whether Plaintiff’s performance was, indeed, unsatisfactory.”).
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procedures would help root out any disagreement concerning the merits of the
termination.147
Indeed, eliminating a VA senior executive’s right to appeal to the MSPB’s
three-member Board severely limits any attempt at judicial review.148 Although
it remains unclear whether the VA senior executive may still seek relief in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 149 as provided in the CSRA,150 the
reviewing panel will not have the benefit of a prior appeals record for review.151
This superficial due process is fundamentally unfair to VA senior executives and
does not comport with the protections afforded under the Due Process Clause.152
The third and final factor to consider under the Mathews test balances the
strength of the governmental interest, “and hence that of the public,” with any
147. See id. at 576–77 (noting that the “risk of erroneous termination” was one of the most
critical factors because of the absolute lack of pre-termination process that the employee received
and because of certain issues of material fact underlying the employee’s termination had yet to be
fully investigated).
148. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, §
707(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1754, 1799; see also Jessica L. Parks, The Merit Systems Protection Board as
a Model Forum, 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 15–16 (1994) (describing the ways in which the MSPB
provides due process for federal employees); Cameron P. Quinn & Katharine A. Klos, Contingency
Enhancements in Attorney Fee Cases, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992) (describing the MSPB as
“strengthen[ing] employee due process protections”).
149. See § 707(a)(1). There is no affirmative statement denying a terminated VA senior
executive the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; however, an appeal to
the Federal Circuit has, arguably, also been eliminated because Congress eliminated a VA senior
executive’s right to appeal to the MSPB’s three-member Board; see also Joe Davidson, Court
Action Challenges VA Firing Law, WASH. POST, May 13, 2015, http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/05/13/court-action-challenges-va-firing-law/ (highlighting a
terminated VA SES employee challenge of the Act in court, where the Department of Justice,
representing the VA, argued that the ALJ’s decision to terminate the employee was “final and
[should] not be subject to any further appeal”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (2012) (providing for judicial review of MSPB decisions); see also
§ 707(a)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section 7703 of title 5, the
decision of an administrative judge . . . shall be final and shall not be subject to any further appeal.”);
but see § 702 (providing for judicial review of an agency action where “[a] person suffer[s] [a] legal
wrong” or is “adversely affected or aggrieved” by such action “within the meaning of a relevant
statute”).
151. See Friendly, supra note 23, at 1291–92 (noting that “a written statement of reasons[] [is]
almost essential if there is to be judicial review,” and that in administrative appeals a record would
be necessary).
152. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“The ultimate balance involves a
determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be
imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”); see also Richard C. McCrea, Jr.,
Loudermill—What Pretermination Process is “Due” Public Employees, 60 FLA. B.J. 37, 38–39
(1986) (“In the first place, public employers cannot simply rely . . . upon blind adherence to their
statutory or administrative termination procedure. While such . . . provisions may create property
interests for public employees, they cannot define what process is due once such a property interest
exists.”); supra text accompanying notes 139–41 and 145 (discussing the fact that termination
procedures for VA senior executives differ from the procedures for other agencies’ senior
executives).
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associated administrative or financial burdens imposed upon the government in
affording individuals additional process.153 Congress asserts that the revised
procedures are necessary to provide the Secretary of the VA with the proper
tools to enhance management quality and accountability among the VA’s
SES. 154 On the surface, this appears to be a valid governmental interest
recognized by the courts as significant. 155 This interest, however, fails to
advance Congress’s stated goal in legislating the Act when balanced against
private interests.156
Significantly, the CSRA already provides “for cause” removal through which
an agency can terminate a member of the SES.157 In fact, the new Secretary of
the VA, Robert McDonald, conceded that the new termination provisions did
not alter some of the most important aspects of the current agency termination
process, particularly the actual process of terminating an employee in the first
place.158 Moreover, there is no indication that the new termination provisions
will enhance VA senior executive accountability, as it does not address the
performance metrics that indicate whether a senior executive should be
terminated for poor performance. 159 Although the government’s interest in

153. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
154. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. H4694 (daily ed. May 21, 2014) (statement of Rep. Jeff Miller)
(discussing the objectives of the Act and the depth of the problems it is designed to address).
155. See, e.g., Biliski v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 574 F.3d 214, 221 (3rd Cir.
2009) (determining that a board of education had a “significant . . . interest in removing employees
who fail to perform satisfactorily” as well as an “interest in removing such employees by means
that do not cause disproportionate fiscal or administrative burdens”).
156. See infra notes 158–67 and accompanying text.
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 7543 (2012) (providing that an agency may take action against an SES
employee only for “misconduct, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or failure to accept a directed
reassignment or to accompany a position in a transfer of function”).
158. Josh Hicks, VA Chief Considering Disciplinary Action for up to 1,000 Employees, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/11/07/va-chiefconsidering-disciplinary-action-for-up-to-1000-employees/ (addressing the Secretary’s new
proposal to terminate thirty-five employees, including four senior executives, and noting that
McDonald stated that “the new statute shortened the appeal process but didn’t give him authority
to terminate employees without delay”). McDonald further noted that “[t]he law didn’t grant any
kind of new power that would suddenly give me the ability to walk into a room and simply fire
people.” Id.; see also Jeremy Diamond, VA Chief Announces Restructuring, Firings, CNN.COM
(Nov. 10, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/10/politics/va-reforms-and-restructing/
(noting that “McDonald first needs to build up a case against each person listed on the pink slip
list, since a judge needs to approve each firing”).
159. See 160 CONG. REC. 4695 (daily ed. May 21, 2014) (statement of Rep. Mike Michaud)
(“The Secretary of the [VA] already has the authority to fire any employee, including executives
who are not doing their job. . . . More importantly, [the bill] does not adequately address the
performance metrics of VA executives. It doesn’t provide any framework for ensuring problems
and failures don’t occur in the first place.”).
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promoting efficiency is significant,160 the manner in which it proposes to do so
is not clearly related to the execution of this goal.
Similar to the facts in Mosley, where the asserted governmental interest in
eliminating an employee’s right to either a pre- or a post-termination hearing
was to “efficiently remov[e] unsatisfactory employees without incurring
additional fiscal or administrative burdens,” 161 the reduction of VA’s senior
executives’ appellate rights does not forward Congress’s goal of promoting
efficiency and quality management at the VA. 162 Rather, once the VA
terminates a senior executive, the employee is no longer associated with the
agency.163 The terminated VA senior executive no longer receives a salary or
benefits, even during the pendency of the outcome of an appeal to the MSPB.164
Instead, the VA’s role in the termination, at this point, has ended; the revised
appellate procedures only affect the terminated senior executive. 165 If the
government was truly motivated by a desire to remove unsatisfactory
employees, the changes to the removal process should have been made at the
initial agency level.166
Moreover, there are significant new administrative burdens that inevitably
result from this expedited process. 167 As MSPB Chairwoman Susan Tsui
Grundmann noted, the MSPB is still dealing with the influx of appeals following
160. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding
that the government, as an employer, retains a strong interest in maintaining efficiency and should
therefore “have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal
affairs”).
161. Mosley v. City of Pittsburgh Pub. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 561, 576 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
162. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 158 (reporting that even the Secretary of the VA felt that firing
employees would be a significant challenge under the revised appellate procedures); see also Eric
Katz, VA Officials Say They’re Trying to Fire People, But It’s Still Really Hard, GOV’T EXECUTIVE
(May 13, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/management/2015/05/va-officials-say-theyre-tryingfire-people-its-still-really-hard/112717/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (stating that lawmakers have
been “unimpressed” with reform at the VA in the wake of the new termination procedures); Heath
Druzin, One Year After Phoenix, the VA is Under More Scrutiny Than Ever, STARS AND STRIPES
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.stripes.com/news/veterans/one-year-after-phoenix-the-va-is-undermore-scrutiny-than-ever-1.339036 (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (stating that reports of malfeasance
and retaliation against whistleblowers continue to filter out of the VA and that “[m]uch of the
leadership implicated in wrongdoing throughout the VA system is still in place or on paid leave”).
163. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-146, §
707(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1798, 1798.
164. Id. § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
165. See Merit Systems Protection Board, 79 Fed. Reg. 63,031, 63,031–32 (Oct. 22, 2014).
166. See, e.g., Joe Davidson, House Panel Takes on VA Employee Ratings and Performance
Awards, WASH. POST (June 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_
government/house-panel-takes-on-va-employee-ratings-and-performance-awards/2014/06/22/796
c54f6-f8aa-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html (noting that despite the facts unearthed in the
scandal, the VA, under its performance appraisal system, “rated all of its senior executives as ‘fully
successful’ or better”).
167. See id. (noting Chairwoman Grundmann’s observation that the new termination
procedures only add to ALJs’ workload).
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furloughs by many agencies during the summer of 2013. 168 Tacking on the
requirement of an expedited review process where the MSPB “will have to issue
VA rulings [eighty-three] percent faster than it currently does” to meet the new
deadlines will only add to the current backlog.169
These additional delays could result in a higher probability of error when it
comes to reviewing agency personnel decisions, if review of these decisions is
even possible.170 To better curtail administrative burdens and cut costs, the VA
should change its performance appraisal procedures to detect poorly performing
VA senior executives earlier.171 The agency must still provide a record to the
MSPB for review; however, the agency is doing so under the new truncated
process outlined in section 707.172 If the VA were to keep the original for cause
termination appellate procedures and rights in place, while only adjusting
performance appraisal procedures, the VA would merely experience minimal
additional administrative burdens.173
Based on the current language of section 707 of the Act, a challenge to the
constitutionality of the afforded process is likely. 174 Terminated VA senior
executives could argue that the legislative process was defective, claiming that
168. Id. (noting that the MSPB has only adjudicated 6,000 of the 33,000 appeals resulting from
the furloughs, and that the 200-employee MSPB will now have to process potential additional
appeals from the VA).
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 159–66 and accompanying text; see also Tom Cohen & Curt Devine,
Performance Reviews at Troubled VA Showed No Bad Senior Managers, CNN.COM (June 20,
2014, 10:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/20/politics/va-scandal-bonuses/ (noting that senior
VA managers around the country—despite the horrific incidents occurring in their medical centers
and offices ranging from exposure to hepatitis B and C, “inexcusable” wait times, and a bacterial
outbreak that killed six patients—received bonuses in the thousands of dollars in 2014). To address
this issue, Rep. Jeff Miller (R-FL) introduced “Increasing VA Accountability to Veterans Act of
2015” on January 22, 2015. H.R. 473-Increasing the Department of Veterans Affairs
Accountability to Veterans Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bill/473 (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). Among other reforms, the bill seeks to
reform the performance appraisal system for senior executives by limiting the number of senior
executives who can receive certain rating levels. See Increasing the Department of Veterans Affairs
Accountability to Veterans Act of 2015, H.R. 473, 114th Cong. § 3(a)(1).
172. § 707(a)(1), 128 Stat. at 1799.
173. See Hicks, supra note 158 (suggesting that the work required to terminate a poorly
performing VA senior executive did not necessarily decrease with the advent of the new termination
procedures).
174. See, e.g., Eric Katz, Federal Appeals Board Has Major Concerns with Firing Provisions
in New VA Law, GOV’T EXEC. (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.govexec.com/management/2014/
08/federal-appeals-board-has-major-concerns-firing-provisions-new-va-law/90887/?oref=related
stories (according to MSPB Chairwoman Susan Tsui Grundmann, “[r]emoving the [MSPB] from
the [firing process] raises a ‘larger question of constitutionality’”); see also Davidson, supra note
149 (highlighting a terminated VA employee’s challenge to her termination in federal court, which
cites due process violations as well as violations of the “‘[A]ppointments [C]lause’ of the
Constitution, by taking away authority from officials who are appointed by the [P]resident and
confirmed by the Senate”).
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it failed to include review by the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and ignored
admonitions by Congressional members concerning the revised process. 175
Additionally, one could argue that it is unclear how the expedited termination
and review process actually furthers the VA’s stated goal of enhancing
accountability. For instance, MSPB Chairwoman Susan Tsui Grundmann stated
that the expedited firings “could challenge the meritocratic system at the core of
the civil service” because these new tools give the VA the potential to “clean
house.”176
III. A PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE VA: A CALL FOR
REVISION OF SECTION 707 AND A REDUCTION OF PRE-TERMINATION
PROCEDURES
A. Revise Section 707 to Comply with Due Process by Providing Terminated
VA Senior Executives with a Meaningful Post-Termination Hearing
In light of the significant private interest at stake, the fact that the revised
termination procedures do not advance the governmental interest, in addition to
the heightened risk of error based on the expedited review of an agency decision,
it is unlikely that a court will conclude that Section 707’s expedited review
procedures comport with Due Process.177
Still, based on case law and the statutory exception that notice does not have
to be provided if the agency has “reasonable cause” to believe that the employee
has “committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed,”
the Act’s removal of any pre-termination notice and hearing arguably complies
with the Due Process Clause.178 The misconduct uncovered at the VA alone
may constitute criminal conduct179 and could trigger the statutory exception,
implicating the type of situations noted in both Gilbert and Mallen.180
In both of these cases, the terminated individuals were public employees
situated in positions of substantial trust 181 and both individuals involved
breached their duty of trust and loyalty to the public by engaging in criminal

175. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
176. Katz, supra note 174.
177. See Eric Katz, Burden of Proof: The New Reality for Senior Execs at VA, GOV’T EXEC.
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.govexec.com/management/2014/10/burden-proof-new-reality-seniorexecs-va/97286/ (noting that various parties have objected to the constitutionality of the new
termination procedures, in part because they create a presumption of a terminated employee’s
“guilt”).
178. See supra notes 40, 96–105 and accompanying text.
179. Evan Perez, FBI Launches Criminal Probe of VA, CNN.COM (June 11, 2014, 11:20 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/11/politics/va-fbi-probe/ (indicating that the FBI opened a criminal
investigation into the Phoenix VAMC scandal during the spring of 2014).
180. See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
181. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 925 (1997); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S.
230, 232–33 (1988).
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conduct.182 The Court determined that the interest in upholding the integrity of
the public purpose was strong enough to eliminate the pre-termination hearing
entirely. 183 Of course, full post-termination hearings would be necessary for
sufficient Due Process.184
Similar to the employees in Gilbert and Mallen, a VA senior executive is
involved in the public sphere as a high-level civil servant, incurring substantial
trust.185 If the alleged misconduct involves the type of conduct that occurred at
the Phoenix VAMC,186 then the public interest in removing an employee without
a pre-termination hearing would be substantial. 187 To retain this ability,
however, Congress should repeal the provisions mandating expedited review by
the MSPB and rendering the agency decision final if an ALJ is unable to make
a determination in order to ensure that the terminated VA senior executive is
afforded the requisite meaningful post-termination hearing to properly
investigate an agency decision. As established in Loudermill, all that is needed
is the opportunity for a “meaningful” hearing.188 This meaningful hearing can
either come before or after a termination, as in the cases of Mallen 189 and
Carter,190 as long as one is provided at some point during the process.
B. Reduce the Degree of Pre-Termination Process Provided to SES Employees
The public’s response to the various reports of misconduct and abuse of
authority at the VA shows that there is a general desire for reform.191 Even if

182. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 926–27; Mallen, 486 U.S. at 231–32.
183. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932–33; Mallen, 486 U.S. at 245.
184. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546–48 (1985).
185. GUIDE TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE, supra note 34, at 2 (stating that SES
employees are “charged with leading the Federal Government and producing results for the
American people”).
186. See Bronstein & Griffin, supra note 1 (describing the misconduct that occurred at the
Phoenix VAMC in connection with the wait-time scandal).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 181–84.
188. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (finding
that the due process rights of a biological father were violated when the mother proceeded with an
adoption proceeding without fair notice and an opportunity for the father to present his evidence,
resulting in an opportunity that was not “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”).
189. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 244 (1988).
190. Carter v. W. Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1985).
191. Emily Swanson, Veterans Administration Faces Public Opinion Crisis, Too,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 21, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/21/
veterans-administration-poll_n_5366900.html (noting that in the wake of the Phoenix VAMC
scandal, one recent poll found that “[n]early half of Americans think that returning veterans receive
worse care from Veterans Affairs hospitals than they would from civilian hospitals”); Travis J.
Tritten, VA Reform Bill Preserves Employee Bonuses, STARS & STRIPES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://
www.stripes.com/news/veterans/va-reform-bill-preserves-employee-bonuses-1.296911 (reporting
that “[d]espite public outrage over dysfunctional and dangerously run hospitals,” the Veterans
Access, Choice, and Accountability Act was signed into law while still preserving hefty bonuses
for VA executives).
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Congress repeals section 707’s provisions concerning the expedited timeline by
the MSPB, the initial motivation and goal behind section 707 is not entirely
lost.192 Given the gravity of the accusations against senior executives at the
Phoenix VAMC and various other VA facilities, 193 disciplinary measures are
warranted.
Although the elimination of pre-termination notice arguably complies with
adequate Due Process as long as terminated senior executives are provided with
a meaningful post-termination hearing, the timeliness of removing an
underperforming employee is still a problem. 194 The VA’s performance
appraisal system already provides the means to efficiently remove employees
based on performance.195 What appears to be lacking, however, is sufficient use
of this system.
The creation of an independent oversight committee to ensure that the VA is
effectively enforcing these measures is one mechanism by which Congress could
monitor the VA’s progress.196 Additionally, the VA should increase its efforts
internally by enhancing communication with its employees through interoffice
memoranda outlining specific criteria for satisfactory and unsatisfactory
performance, such as its recent issuance of an office-wide update to its handbook
detailing the type of conduct associated with each performance rating.197 By
transforming the evaluation of personnel performance from an insular to a more
public medium, individuals will be made more aware of the agency’s
expectations.198

192. See supra text accompanying notes 156, 159–60, 162.
193. Perez, supra note 179; see also Christina Marcos, House Passes Third ‘15 Appropriations
Bill, THE HILL (May 30, 2014, 1:16 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/207689house-passes-third-2015-appropriations-bill (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that the House
passed a funding measure authorizing $1 million designated for a Department of Justice
investigation into criminal activity at the VA).
194. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 280 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (stipulating that a terminated
employee receive a hearing at a “reasonable time”).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2012) (providing for review and removal
of senior executives).
196. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the
United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 137–38 (2012). Shkabatur addresses accountability
measures and attempts at reform throughout federal agencies, with a special focus on President
Obama’s platform for enhancing transparency in the federal government. Id. at 113. In addition
to implementing measures within the agencies, the author proposes creating a congressional
independent oversight board, which would have the authority to discipline agencies that disregard
transparency measures through sanctions. Id. at 137–38.
197. See VA Directive 5027; Handbook 5027/2, Part V, at 8–9 (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www1.va.
gov/vapubs/viewPublication.asp?Pub_ID=773&FType=2.
198. Ingraham & Moynihan, supra note 34, at 121–22 (discussing the need for performance
expectations to be communicated to all levels of an agency).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Section 707 of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014
raises several due process concerns. The legitimate property interest of
continued employment in a “for cause” removal setting—a generally accepted
property interest recognized by the Supreme Court—triggers the Mathews
analysis.199 Despite the general principle that legislation incorporates adequate
due process,200 the conclusions of the Mathews balancing test show that both the
private interest of continued employment and the heightened risk of error
resulting from an expedited appellate process outweigh the government’s
efficiency interest.201
The expedited termination proceedings, in addition to suspect legal
justifications, are also unlikely to provide the reform that is needed at the VA.202
Instead, legislation should focus reform on internal adjustments aimed at
promoting accountability. 203 Rather than looking for a blunt mechanism to
terminate seemingly underperforming employees, the VA would be better
served to evaluate these individuals against clear agency-wide expectations, and
enforce these expectations accordingly.204 Further, the ability to fire employees
is not the main obstacle in enhancing accountability, as the Secretary of the VA
has always retained this power. 205 Rather, internal measures of the VA
effectively using its performance appraisal system and working to reintegrate a
service-oriented culture among all levels would provide the VA with the
accountability necessary for success.206

199. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1965) (recognizing a
property interest in continued public employment).
200. See supra text accompanying note 123.
201. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340, 343, 347 (1976); see also supra Part II.B.
202. See supra notes 162–73 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part III.
204. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part III.
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